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An Exploration of the Association 
Between Fuel Subsidies and Fuel 
Riots 
Neil McCulloch, Davide Natalini, Naomi Hossain and Patricia Justino 
October 2021 
Summary 
Between 2005 and 2018, 41 countries had at least one riot directly associated 
with popular demand for fuel. We make use of a new international data set on 
fuel riots to explore the effects of fuel prices and price regimes on fuel riots. In 
line with prior expectations, we find that large domestic fuel price shocks – often 
linked to international price shocks – are a key driver of riots. In addition, we 
report a novel result: fuel riots are closely associated with domestic price 
regimes. Countries that maintain fixed price regimes – notably net energy 
exporters – tend to have large fuel subsidies. When such subsidies become 
unsustainable, domestic price adjustments are large, often leading to riots. 
Keywords 
Fuel subsidies; fuel riots; protests; conflict; price regimes; energy. 
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In 2019, there were major protests related to energy in Sudan, France, 
Zimbabwe, Haiti, Lebanon, Ecuador, Iraq, Chile, and Iran – many of which turned 
into riots. In most years between 2005 and 2018, there have been energy-
related riots in at least one or two countries. It is therefore surprising that there is 
limited academic literature that explores the determinants of fuel riots.1 A 
significant literature on energy-related conflict has established a close 
association between violent conflict and the discovery or abundance of fossil 
fuels (e.g., Van der Ploeg 2011; Ross 2004; Carbonnier and Wagner 2011). 
There is also strong evidence that conflict and unrest may be related to 
increases in oil prices. In a seminal paper, Dube and Vargas (2013) show that 
increases in the international price of oil are associated with increases in 
violence in Colombia in municipalities in oil-producing regions. This result is 
confirmed in a recent review of 350 studies by Blair, Christensen and Rudkin 
(2020), who conclude that the probability of conflict is positively associated with 
increases in oil prices. 
However, most of the existing literature focuses on armed conflict and its relation 
to fossil fuels, and knowledge about less violent forms of political violence (like 
riots) is more limited.2 Evidence on the mechanisms that may explain the 
association between shocks in international oil prices and conflict is also limited. 
This paper addresses these gaps by drawing on a unique database on fuel riots 
(Natalini, Bravo and Newman 2020) to examine in detail the association between 
fuel riots and fuel price shocks. We find, as expected, a positive association 
between international oil prices and fuel riots. We show that this effect is 
associated with the domestic price regime and fuel subsidies. We find that 
countries that are net energy exporters are much more likely to fix domestic fuel 
prices to protect local populations against price rises. However, countries that fix 
prices tend to have much larger fuel subsidies and, when these can no longer be 
sustained, much bigger domestic price adjustments are needed, often leading to 
riots. These results are robust when tested for different definitions of the 
dependent variable. We report also that fuel prices subsidies do not affect other 
broader forms of riots (i.e., riots about other issues), as defined in the Armed 
Conflict Location and Event Data (ACLED) data set. 
These results are an important contribution because the existing literature on 
riots and civil unrest rarely takes into consideration how fluctuations in 
international prices of oil may be transmitted to local markets in ways that may 
 
1  Henceforth we use the phrase ‘fuel riots’ since the vast majority of such riots are, at least superficially, 
about the price of fuel. For a detailed definition of fuel riots see (Natalini et al. 2020). 
2  One exception is Natalini (2016) who examines the role of scarcity, prices and political fragility in driving 
food and fuel riots using a quantitative and agent-based modelling approach. 
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drive citizens to riot. This transmission is not a given because several countries 
adopt subsidy policies to cushion local markets against fluctuations in the 
international price of oil. As long as these price regimes are sustainable, it is 
unlikely that changes in the international price of oil will affect local markets and, 
therefore, the probability of riots occurring. While some countries allow 
international prices to pass through fully to domestic prices, others fix domestic 
prices – at least temporarily – in an attempt to protect domestic consumers from 
such shocks. We find that this can be counterproductive as it is these very 
countries that are most likely to experience fuel riots. This is because fixing 
prices below international prices generates fuel subsidies whose size depends 
on the regulated domestic price and the international price of fuel. When high 
international fuel prices are sustained for an extended period of time, these 
governments have to drastically reduce subsidies, therefore generating a large 
jump in national prices, which can trigger a riot. 
The propensity to use fuel subsidies to protect domestic consumers is often 
linked to the structure of the economy. Fuel exporters are particularly likely to 
have the kind of consumer price subsidies that are the object of protests (Cheon, 
Urpelainen and Lackner 2013; Victor 2009). In energy-rich countries where state 
capacity to distribute resources is weak, consumer fuel subsidies tend to be 
common and resilient to reform efforts (Inchauste and Victor 2017). Authoritarian 
regimes are particularly likely to rely on such subsidy regimes as a source of 
popular legitimacy (Andresen 2008; Rosser 2006). Where other forms of social 
protection are limited, or natural resource wealth is highly concentrated, or where 
economic performance is poor, subsidies may be seen as part of the social 
contract (Lockwood 2015; McCulloch, Moerenhout and Yang 2021). However, 
when such subsidies become unsustainable, governments often attempt to 
reduce them by raising fuel prices sharply (Rentschler and Bazilian 2017; 
Lockwood 2015). When these adjustments result in large increases in the 
domestic price of oil, social discontent may rise, potentially increasing the 
likelihood of protests and riots. 
Our paper also contributes to the literature on fossil fuel subsidies. This literature 
is largely concerned with detailing the size of subsidies (Coady et al. 2017), the 
distributional impact of subsidies (Arze del Granado, Coady and Gillingham 
2012), the impact of subsidies on economic and environmental performance 
(Rentschler, Kornejew and Bazilian 2017; Erickson et al. 2020), and the impact 
of subsidy reforms on the poor, among other groups (Rentschler 2016; Soile and 
Mu 2015). There is also a growing literature on the political economy of fossil fuel 
subsidy reform (Inchauste and Victor 2017; Skovgaard and van Asselt 2018), 
which provides a nuanced understanding of the complexities of policy reform and 
why so little progress has been made on it (Ross, Hazlett and Mahdavi 2017). 
However, this literature rarely mentions an association between price subsidies 
 
ids.ac.uk Working Paper Volume 2021 Number 556 





and fuel riots, other than as an explanation of why reforms stop or stall, or as a 
reason why reforms are not attempted in the first place. 
The paper proceeds as follows. Section 2 describes the data we use in the paper 
and provides brief descriptive statistics. Section 3 discusses the main results 
including an analysis of price regimes as potential mediators of the relationship 
between fuel prices and riots; we also present some robustness tests. Section 4 
examines why countries fix prices and create subsidies. Section 5 concludes. 
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2. Data and descriptive statistics 
The definition and data we use in this paper to measure the occurrence of fuel 
riots comes from Natalini et al. (2020). Fuel riots are defined by the authors as 
‘incidents of significant unrest – riots, demonstrations, major protests – where 
grievances over fuel prices, the prospective removal of subsidies, or fuel 
availability were specifically identified as a factor which motivated people 
involved in the violent event’ (Natalini et al. 2020: 3).  
The original database spanned the period between 2005 and 2016 and was 
updated to 2018 for this paper using the same methodology. Specifically, we 
performed a manual Google search with a set of keywords to identify events that 
matched our definition of fuel riots. Although more sophisticated event collection 
methodologies exist (e.g., machine learning), these tend to be extremely time-
consuming and often result in a large number of duplicates (e.g., via news feed 
repositories such as LexisNexis), and therefore a manual approach was 
preferred.3 Keywords included different combinations and declinations of the 
words fuel/energy, violence, riot/protest and for every combination we reviewed 
the first ten pages of Google results.  
The search was global in scope and included only English online newspapers (or 
re-published articles translated into English from the original language). The data 
set may therefore suffer from different types of biases (e.g., towards larger, more 
important events) that are very common when performing global-level research 
such as this and difficult to avoid (Dowd et al. 2020). However, given the 
parameters we used, we believe the data set represents a conservative portrayal 
of fuel riots across the world between 2005 and 2018. The data were recorded 
on a monthly basis. When undertaking analysis with annual data, we aggregated 
the data by constructing a binary variable for whether the country had a fuel riot 
during the year or not.4 Figure 2.1 shows the geographical distribution of fuel 
riots over the period. 
  
 
3  See Newman (2020) for a comprehensive discussion on challenges with automatised event data 
collection with the example of food riots. 
4  Doing so loses very little information in the annual data because there were only two countries that had 
more than one fuel riot in the same year – India in 2010 and Indonesia in 2013. 
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Figure 2.1 Map of incidence of fuel riots 2005–18 
Source: Authors’ own. Created using MapChart CC-BY-SA 4.0. 
 
Between 2005 and 2018, we observe 59 country-years in which fuel riots 
occurred. In one sense, these are relatively rare events since there are 3,011 
country-years in our data. However, fuel riots happen in quite a few countries; 41 
of the 217 countries or jurisdictions in our data set experienced a fuel riot over 
the period. Some countries experienced several fuel riots in that period. India 
had seven, Indonesia had five, and China and Yemen both had three. 
To understand the relationship between prices, subsidies and fuel riots, data was 
obtained on the international price of oil, the level of fuel subsidies, and the 
domestic price regime implemented in each country. Average international prices 
for crude oil were sourced from the World Bank’s Commodity Price Database.5 
The data on fossil fuel subsidies comes from the International Monetary Fund 
(IMF)’s calculation of subsidies for the period 2010–17. We use estimates for 
‘total consumer pre-tax subsidies’, which include four energy sources (oil, natural 
gas, coal and electricity) as these capture the difference between retail prices 
and international price of the resource when this is internationally traded (i.e., 
fuel), and the difference between the retail price and the user cost (cost of 
production) for those not usually traded (i.e., electricity) (Coady et al. 2017). Our 
assessment of the domestic price regime is based on an analysis of monthly 
price changes in the data set of international and domestic gasoline prices 
compiled by Ross et al. (2017) which contains information about local retail 
gasoline prices for 157 countries from 2003–15. 
 
5  The Pink Sheet. 
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Globally, fuel riots are clearly related to the price of oil. Figure 2.2 shows the 
number of fuel riots that took place globally for each year from 2005–18 
alongside the international oil price. As expected, fuel riots spike when 
international oil prices spike since this generally has a direct impact on the 
domestic price of fuel. 






Source: Authors’ own. Created using project data. 
However, there are several other factors that may influence the likelihood of a 
fuel riot. Since Gurr (1970), a large literature has shown how relative deprivation 
and drops in economic standing may give rise to social discontent and 
grievances.6 Therefore, it is reasonable to expect the number of fuel riots to be 
associated with the general development of the country. In addition, our fuel riots 
variable measures whether there has been a violent riot related to energy during 
that year, which makes it more likely that we will observe such riots in countries 
with larger populations simply because there are more people that might feel 
sufficiently unhappy to participate in a riot. We therefore include in our analysis 
country-level gross domestic product (GDP) per capita and population as 
controls using data compiled from the World Bank’s World Development 
Indicators database. 
 
6  See the review of this literature in Justino and Martorano (2019). 
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Finally, there are several different aspects of governance which might also 
influence fuel riots. The Varieties of Democracy (Coppedge et al. 2019) and the 
Polity IV data sets (Marshall 2019) provide a comprehensive set of variables 
measuring different aspects of the political and governance makeup of countries 
over time. We draw on this to explore the impact of four variables. First, 
populations may be angered by government incompetence and/or corruption; we 
therefore include measures of government effectiveness and the extent of 
corruption. Second, the likelihood of fuel riots may be influenced by the ability to 
protest. Mass protests may also be more likely when there is space for civic 
engagement, independent media, and organisations capable of mobilising 
support are present (Tilly and Tarrow 2015). Conversely, protests may be less 
likely under authoritarian regimes that suppress civil society freedom; we 
therefore include measures of regime type and civil society freedom. Finally, riots 
may not be accidents; rather they may be deliberately orchestrated by groups 
seizing the opportunity of rising prices to mobilise people against the 
government. We therefore include a measure that assesses the existence of 
‘anti-system’ movements within the country.7 
 
7  See Annexe Table A1 for a summary of all variables and descriptive statistics. 
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3.1 Domestic price changes and fuel riots 
Our first objective is to see if there is a relationship between monthly domestic 
price changes and fuel riots. Given the range of other factors that could 
potentially influence the occurrence of fuel riots, we estimate a fixed effects 
panel regression of the propensity for a fuel riot against the growth in domestic 
and international fuel prices. We control for the possibility of common time 
effects (for example, induced by changes in international oil prices) using month 
dummies for the entire period. By including country fixed effects, we eliminate 
the possibility that any observed association is due to fixed country 
characteristics that might affect the likelihood of a fuel riot. As noted above, there 
is also a possibility that time-varying country characteristics may influence the 
likelihood of a fuel riot. We therefore include the log of per capita GDP and the 
log of population as controls. The model that we estimate is: 
 
where Riotim indicates that country i had a riot in month m; ∆pdomim is the 
proportionate change in the domestic fuel price in the preceding month; ∆pintim is 
the proportionate change in the international fuel price in the preceding month; 
lnGDPpciy is log GDP per capita for country i in year y; lnPopiy is log of the 
population; γm is a month dummy; λi is the country fixed effect; and ϵim represents 
a random error term. 
Table 3.1 shows that there is a statistically significant positive relationship 
between domestic price growth from month to month and fuel riots. The 
estimated coefficient suggests that an increase in the growth rate of local prices 
of, say 10 percentage points, would increase the (initially low) probability of a fuel 
riot by around 13 per cent. However, the relationship with international fuel prices 
is much weaker and not statistically significant, even if domestic price changes 
are omitted, suggesting that riots are driven more by the way in which domestic 
prices are determined than by international price fluctuations. 
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Table 3.1 Fuel riots and price changes 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Fuel riot Fuel riot Fuel riot 
Growth of domestic gasoline price 0.0459∗∗∗ 0.0444∗∗∗  
 (7.11) (6.98)  
Growth of world gasoline price 0.00855  0.0124 
 (0.47)  (0.68) 
Log GDP per capita -0.00196 -0.00310 -0.00285 
 (-0.38) (-0.61) (-0.55) 
Log population -0.00129 -0.00114 -0.00134 
 (-0.16) (-0.14) (-0.17) 
Observations 18,307 18,587 18,307 
Source: Authors’ own. Created using project data. 
t statistics in parentheses 
Fixed effects regression with month dummies 
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
3.2 The role of price regimes 
We hypothesised in the introduction to this paper that the effect of fuel prices on 
fuel riots discussed above may be affected by price regimes. To analyse this 
mechanism, we proceed in three steps. First, we estimate the effect of changes 
in international prices on domestic prices to check how international price shocks 
may be transmitted to local markets. Second, we test whether fixing domestic 
prices – which effectively results in subsidies on fuel – may cushion domestic 
prices against international price changes. Finally, we estimate the effect of such 
subsidies on fuel riots. 
Domestic fuel prices are largely driven by international price changes, but this 
relationship can be dampened somewhat by fixing prices domestically, at least 
for a while. To assess the extent as to which this is true, we need a measure of 
the extent to which prices are fixed. Unfortunately, we are unaware of any 
database that indicates the policy regime followed by all countries over time. 
However, it is possible to infer the policy regime by looking at the extent to which 
prices change.8 We therefore use the database of monthly domestic prices 
described above to construct a measure of price ‘fixedness’ which is simply the 
percentage of months that domestic fuel prices remained the same. If a country 
has a fixedness of zero, it has a completely flexible price regime in which prices 
change every month, while if it has a fixedness of 100 then its price regime is 
 
8  For the moment, we have assumed that the policy regime remains fixed over the period for which we 
have data. 
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completely rigid with no changes in domestic prices at all between 2005 and 
2018. 
Of the 157 countries for which we have monthly domestic price data, 73 have 
regimes in which the price changes every month. By contrast, only two countries 
had no price changes at all over the period. All other countries kept prices fixed 
at least for some months. However, most let prices adjust regularly. Over three-
quarters of the countries adjusted prices at least every two months, while only 
around a fifth of countries adjusted domestic prices infrequently. To simplify, we 
define a country as having a ‘fixed price regime’ if it keeps domestic prices the 
same more than 80 per cent of the time across all months for which we have 
data. If the country fixes prices less than this, we define it as having a ‘flexible 
price regime’. 
To answer our question about the pass-through of international prices to the 
local market in each country, we estimate the following model: 
 (2) 
where  is the growth of the domestic fuel price in a country between month 
m and the preceding month;  is the growth in the international fuel price 
during the same period;  and  are the growth in international prices in 
the preceding months; and ϵm represents a random error term. 
Our model reflects the fact that international prices are unlikely to pass through 
immediately to domestic prices but may do so with some lag. Thus, β0 represents 
the short-run pass-through of international prices, while the sum β0 + β1 + β2 
provides an estimate of the long-run pass-through of prices.9 Since countries 
have quite different approaches to regulating domestic prices, it is likely that the 
value of these coefficients will differ substantially by country. We therefore 
estimate this model separately for all countries. We find that for the median 
country, the short-run pass through is around 0.1 – that is around 10 per cent of 
the change in the international price is passed through to domestic markets in 
the same month; the long-run pass through is around 0.3. 
Our hypothesis is that a policy of fixing local prices should reduce the pass 
through of international prices. Figure 3.1 shows the range of estimates of short-
run and long-run pass-through coefficients for countries with flexible and fixed 
price regimes. As anticipated both short-run and long-run pass-through 
coefficients in fixed price regime countries are significantly below those in 
countries with a flexible price regime. The median short-run pass through for 
countries with flexible price regimes is 0.12 and the median long-run pass 
through is 0.33; however, for countries with fixed price regimes the equivalent 
 
9  Where long-run means three months in this instance. 
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figures are 0.005 and 0.08. As one might expect, countries which fix prices most 
of the time pass through international price shocks much less. 
Figure 3.1 Pass-through of international prices 
under flexible and fixed price regimes 
Source: Authors’ own. Created using project data. 
However, while fixing prices does appear to reduce domestic price volatility in 
the short term, it also has a major impact on the size of domestic price increases 
when they do occur. Figure 3.2 shows the mean price change for the months in 
which price changes occurred for all countries plotted against the extent to which 
they fix prices.10 Countries that adjusted prices frequently (low fixedness), tended 
to have relatively small adjustments. However, those that fixed prices and held 
them for longer, tended to have much larger price increases when prices did 
change. 
Dividing countries again into flexible and fixed price regimes as above, we find 
that the mean price change for countries with flexible price regimes was 0.7 per 
cent (the standard deviation of price changes was also 0.7); but for fixed price 
regimes (i.e., those that kept prices the same for more than 80 per cent of the 
time), the mean price change was 17.3 per cent, almost 24 times larger. The 
 
10  Here we are using the continuous measure of price fixedness described above i.e., the percentage of 
months in which prices stay the same. 
Flexible price regime Fixed price regime 
Pass-through (long-run) Pass-through (short-run) 
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standard deviation of price changes for this group of countries was 27, almost 40 
times larger. Even if we include all of the months in which there is no change in 
price in the calculation of the mean price change and standard deviation, the 
mean price change for fixed price regime countries is 68 per cent higher than 
that of flexible price regimes and the standard deviation more than double. In 
short, fixed price regimes may protect populations from international price 
changes over the relatively short term, but when price changes do happen, they 
are much larger. 








Source: Authors’ own. Created using project data. 
Why does fixing prices result in large domestic price shocks? The discussion in 
the introduction to this paper suggests that this is because fixing prices tends to 
create large subsidies. When such subsidies become fiscally unsustainable, 
governments choose to raise the domestic price. If this is true, we would expect 
to find evidence of a strong relationship between fixing prices and subsidies. We 
use the data on domestic and international gasoline prices in (Ross et al. 2017) 
as well as their data on gasoline consumption to construct a measure of gasoline 
subsidies for each country and year. We then regress annual gasoline subsidies 
on international oil prices and our measure of price fixedness. As before, there 
are a range of country specific reasons why gasoline subsidies might be high, 
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and gasoline subsidies are also likely to be influenced by the international oil 
price in any given year. As before we account for these by estimating using a 
fixed effects panel model, including GDP per capita and population as time-
varying controls. 
Table 3.2 Subsidies, oil prices and price fixing 
 Log fuel subsidies 
(Ross) 
Log of real oil price 0.199 ** 
(2.55) 
Price fixedness 0.00252 *** 
(3.46) 





Source: Authors’ own. Created using project data. 
t statistics in parentheses 
Panel regression with country level fixed effects 
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
Table 3.2 shows that, as expected, higher oil prices make gasoline subsidies 
larger – but fixing domestic gasoline prices also increases subsidies significantly. 
Increasing the level of price fixedness from its mean level of 23 per cent, to 75 
per cent (equivalent to shifting from changing prices every three months to 
changing prices every nine months) more than doubles gasoline subsidies. 
So far, we have shown that domestic price shocks are associated with fuel riots; 
that domestic price changes are larger in regimes that attempt to fix prices for 
longer; and that fixing gasoline prices increases gasoline subsidies. But gasoline 
subsidies are only one part of the energy subsidies that countries have. Many 
countries also subsidise other fuels including diesel, kerosene, coal, natural gas, 
and electricity. Our hypothesis is that it is the fiscal unsustainability of such 
subsidies that gives rise to the large energy price shocks. Reducing or removing 
such subsidies may abrogate a social contract which could lead to violent protest 
(McCulloch et al. 2021). If this is the case, we would expect to see that subsidies 
have an independent impact on the likelihood of fuel riots. 
However, there are also competing explanations for fuel riots which fall into two 
areas. First, as suggested in Gurr (1970) and a large literature on economic 
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deprivation and unrest that followed it, riots may be a reaction to worsening 
economic conditions in general, rather than specifically related to energy subsidy 
reform. Second, people may be angry about different aspects of the governance 
of the country and use price changes in fuels as a pretext to protest against a 
wider set of issues (Hossain et al. 2018). 
To explore these in an integrated way, we estimate the following model: 
Riotit = β0+β1.L.lnSubsidiesit + β2.GDPgrowthit + β3.Governanceit+ 
β4.lnGDPpcit + β5.lnPopit + γt + λi + ϵit (3) 
where Riotit indicates that country i had (at least) one riot in year t; lnSubsidiesit is 
the log of pre-tax subsidies for country i in year t; GDPgrowthit is the growth in 
GDP between year t − 1 and year t; Governanceit is a vector of governance 
factors explained below; and lnGDPpcit and lnPopit are GDP per capita and 
population controls as before, γt is a time dummy; λi is the country fixed effect; 
and ϵit represents a random error term. 
We use total pre-tax energy subsidies from the comprehensive database 
provided by the IMF.11 We lag this variable to minimise endogeneity due to the 
fact that a subsidy reform early in a year could cause a riot, but also reduce the 
value of subsidies. 
To account for the possibility of poor general economic performance leading to 
riots (even if they are ostensibly about energy), we include GDP growth as an 
independent variable. If this is important, we would expect that recessions should 
be associated with riots (i.e., β2 will be negative). 
Table 3.3 shows the results. Our first model includes only lagged subsidies and 
the GDP per capita and population controls. Subsidies are strongly positively 
associated with fuel riots. The coefficient suggests that a 10 per cent increase in 
the size of subsidies will increase the probability of a fuel riot by around one third. 
Model 2 explores whether fuel riots are also driven by poor economic 
performance. The statistically significant negative coefficient would appear to 
suggest that this is the case, although the effect is small.12 We treat this result 
with caution because riots may well influence GDP growth; lagging the GDP 
growth variable results in no statistically significant result. In either case, the size 
and significance of the effect of subsidies is unchanged. 
 
11  By ‘pre-tax subsidies’ the IMF mean the financial value of subsidies before adding optimal taxation to 
account for the externalities caused by the consumption of energy. 
12  It is also driven in part by the Libyan revolution in 2011 which resulted in extreme values for GDP 
growth; the effect is not statistically significant if one excludes Libya. 
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While the incompetence and corruption of governments is often mentioned by 
protesters as a reason for their actions (Hossain et al. 2018), we find no 
statistically significant relationship between these variables and fuel riots. 
However, we do obtain a particularly interesting result on the relationship 
between civil society freedom and fuel riots. Contrary to our expectations, we 
find that greater civil society freedom results in fewer, rather than more riots. The 
effect is statistically significant and large – an increase of one point on the five-
point scale measuring civil society freedom reduces the likelihood of a fuel riot by 
almost 80 per cent. This suggests that greater openness to dialogue and the 
ability to complain may actually help to avert fuel riots, rather than promote them. 
Finally, we also obtain an interesting result regarding anti-system movements.13 
As expected, we find that the presence of these is positively and strongly 
associated with the increased likelihood of a riot (with a similar size effect as that 
of civil society freedom). 
Table 3.3 Riots and subsidies 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Fuel riot Fuel riot Fuel riot 










Government effectiveness   0.0310 
(0.86) 
Extent of corruption   0.000322 
(0.00) 
Civil society freedom   -0.0221 * 
(-1.73) 
Anti-system movements   0.0265 ** 
(2.06) 












Observations 1,493 1,493 1,335 
Source: Authors’ own. Created using project data. 
t statistics in parentheses 
Panel regression with country level fixed effects and year dummies 
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
 
13  An anti-system opposition movement is any movement – peaceful or armed – that is based in the 
country (not abroad) and is organised in opposition to the current political system – see Coppedge et al. 
(2019) for more details. 
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Taken together, these results strongly suggest that fuel riots are driven by 
changes in domestic fuel prices, but these are mediated by the price regimes in 
place in each country and, in particular, by the size and fiscal sustainability of 
subsidies. Fuel riots are more likely in countries with large energy subsidies. But 
they may also be influenced by the economic performance of the country, as well 
as aspects of country governance, notably whether civil society is free to raise 
complaints and the extent to which opposition groups exist that may wish to 
exploit price rises to discredit the government. 
3.3 Robustness tests 
To assess the robustness of our result that subsidies are associated with fuel 
riots we take two approaches. 
First, we examine the possibility that our dependent variable may be biased. Our 
dependent variable is based on media reports of violence associated with fuel 
related protests, but what constitutes violence is a subjective matter. We 
therefore draw on a separate database constructed for the Global Chaos Map 
Project14 which uses a narrower, but more precise, measure that records fuel 
related protests that led to at least one death. Annexe Table A2 shows the same 
set of regressions as Table 3.3 but using the new dependent variable. Although 
the coefficient on subsidies is smaller, it remains positive and statistically 
significant throughout. 
Second, it could be argued that our results are not picking up an association 
between energy subsidies and fuel riots specifically, but simply the propensity for 
places with large subsidies to have unrest of any kind. To test this, we draw on 
the ACLED data set, which records a variety of different types of conflict across 
the world and over time and has been used extensively in the analysis of the 
determinants of conflict (Raleigh et al. 2010). Specifically, we replace our 
dependent variable with the sub-event type ‘Riots’ from ACLED. If our results 
were simply capturing riots in general, rather than energy-related riots in 
particular, then we would expect that subsidies would also be associated with 
this measure. Annexe Table A3 shows that this is not the case. Subsidies are not 
significantly associated with riots in general; the connection only exists with riots 
that are linked to energy. 
Finally, we test the robustness of our results to the estimation method used. 
Annexe Table A4 shows our original regression from Table 3.3, alongside 
estimations of the same regression using a panel logit specification, as well as a 
Probit with country dummies. In both cases, the results confirm a strong and 
statistically significant association between subsidies and fuel riots. 
 
14  Global Chaos Map Project. 
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4. Why countries fix prices and 
create subsidies 
Finally, given the adverse impact of fixing domestic prices and thereby creating 
fuel subsidies, as well as their propensity to prompt riots, we explore why so 
many governments use this policy instrument. The literature points towards two 
possible motivations for adopting subsidies by fixing prices. First, people living in 
countries with oil may feel that they are entitled to a share of the benefits. 
Knowing this, states choose to subsidise fuel as a way of providing a benefit to 
the population that is directly linked to the resource (McCulloch et al. 2021). In a 
sense, this is a basic social contract, but one not based on service delivery, but 
rather simply sharing out, in an easy and conspicuous way, some of the 
proceeds of oil wealth. If this is the case, we would expect the adoption of a fixed 
price regime to be strongly associated with being a net energy exporter. 
Second, Victor (2009) argues that some countries subsidise fuel because they 
lack the capacity to implement more sophisticated forms of social protection. If 
this is the case, we would expect to see a negative association between 
government effectiveness and the size of subsidies. 
We therefore regress the size of subsidies against whether the country is a net 
energy exporter and measures of government effectiveness.15 
Table 4.1 shows that the data support both of the hypotheses above. Net energy 
exporters are more likely to have large subsidies. Similarly, countries with more 
effective administration are much less likely to adopt such policies. However, we 
find that several of our measures of governance quality are also associated with 
subsidies. If we substitute our measure of government effectiveness with the 
measures described above for regime type,16 corruption, and civil society 
freedom, our results suggest that more democratic and less corrupt regimes, as 
well as those with greater civil society freedom, also tend to have fewer 
subsidies. While we are not able to assert causality, our results are consistent 
with the hypothesis that such policies are often introduced in resource abundant 
countries with relatively weak governance. 
  
 
15  We cannot use a fixed effects panel regression because whether a country is a net energy exporter is 
almost always a fixed characteristic; we therefore estimate an OLS regression controlling for 
heterogeneity with year and region dummies as well as GDP per capita and population as before. 
16  This takes the values: 0-autocracy; 1-electoral autocracy; 2-electoral democracy; 3-liberal democracy. 
See Coppedge et al. (2019) for details. 
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Table 4.1 Structural determinants of subsidies 



























   -0.103 
(-0.70) 
Regime type  -0.266 ** 
(-3.28) 
   
Extent of 
corruption 
  0.956 *** 
(3.49) 






























Observations 703 698 698 698 698 
Source: Authors’ own. Created using project data. 
t statistics in parentheses 
OLS regression with year and region dummies 
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
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Fuel riots can have major implications for ordinary people and for entire 
countries. They are violent – sometimes leading to deaths – and are highly 
disruptive. Moreover, fuel riots often pre-empt or prevent further attempts at 
policy dialogue and reform – at least for a while (Hossain et al. 2021). 
Our findings suggest that fuel riots are primarily driven by domestic price 
increases. To some extent, these reflect changes in the international oil price, 
but these effects are mediated by how countries attempt to protect their 
populations by fixing domestic prices for periods of time. However, fixed price 
policies (both for fuel and electricity) tend to result in large subsidies which can 
create fiscal strains. Our results show that large subsidies may make fuel riots 
more likely in countries. This is because when these subsidies are no longer 
sustainable, the price increases resulting from a reduction of the subsidies are 
much larger than those that typically occur in countries with more flexible price 
regimes, potentially triggering riots. 
We also find that countries which are net energy exporters are much more likely 
to have large subsidies. Countries with low levels of government capability and 
effectiveness are also more likely to have large subsidies, supporting the idea 
that subsidies are used as an administratively easy way of providing a social 
transfer. Ironically, we find that the large subsidies that such policies produce do 
not protect populations from price shocks and make fuel riots more likely. 
Our findings further emphasise the value of removing fuel subsidies and shifting 
to flexible price regimes. However, this naturally begs the question of why 
countries have not already done so. The answer is likely to lie in the complex 
politics of social contracts in countries that are net exporters of energy. 
Nonetheless, our results should give policymakers further pause for thought 
about the wisdom of policies that perpetuate large subsidies. Subsidies may 
provide short-term political gains but, by making riots more likely, they may have 
large long-term political costs. Going forward, researchers may wish to focus 
more on building a better understanding of the political, and not just the 
economic, dimensions of subsidy reform. 
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Annexe: Summary statistics and 
robustness tests 
Table A1 Summary statistics 
 Mean SD Min Max N 
Fuel riot 0.02 0.14 0.00 1.00 3,011 
GCMP fuel 0.01 0.09 0.00 1.00 3,011 
ACLED riot 0.27 0.44 0.00 1.00 2,452 
Log subsidies 0.47 0.86 0.00 4.35 1,534 
Log fuel subsidies (Ross) -0.08 0.79 -5.15 3.08 886 
Max monthly growth of domestic gasoline 
price 
0.08 0.17 -0.12 4.00 1,696 
Log of real oil price 4.28 0.24 3.82 4.56 3,011 
Price fixedness 23.24 37.19 0.00 100.00 1,696 
Net energy exporter 0.34 0.47 0.00 1.00 1,419 
Government effectiveness -0.02 1.00 -2.48 2.44 2,822 
Regime type 1.65 0.99 0.00 3.00 2,479 
Extent of corruption 0.53 0.30 0.01 0.98 2,479 
Civil society freedom 0.98 1.40 -3.73 3.38 2,479 
Anti-government movements -0.69 1.12 -2.97 3.01 2,479 
Log GDP per capita 8.67 1.50 5.35 12.19 2,780 
GDP growth 3.45 5.35 -62.08 123.14 2,575 
Log population 15.21 2.36 9.21 21.05 2,962 
Source: Authors’ own. Created using project data  
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Table A2 Robustness to alternative dependent 
variables 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 GCMP fuel GCMP fuel GCMP fuel 










Government effectiveness   0.00133 
(0.06) 
Extent of corruption   -0.112 
(-1.58) 
Civil society freedom   -0.0140 * 
(-1.74) 
Anti-government movements   0.0153 * 
(1.89) 












Observations 1,493 1,493 1,335 
Source: Authors’ own. Created using project data. 
t statistics in parentheses 
Panel regression with country level fixed effects and year dummies 
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Table A3 Robustness to use of ACLED dependant 
variable 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 ACLED riot ACLED riot ACLED riot 










Government effectiveness   0.0292 
(0.72) 
Extent of corruption   -0.541 *** 
(-4.49) 
Civil society freedom   0.0164 
(1.19) 
Anti-government movements   -0.00834 
(-0.62) 
Log GDP per capita 
 
 -0.205 ** 
(-2.39) 






Observations 1,242 1,242 1,084 
Source: Authors’ own. Created using project data. 
t statistics in parentheses 
Panel regression with country level fixed effects and year dummies 
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
  
 
ids.ac.uk Working Paper Volume 2021 Number 556 





Table A4 Robustness to estimation method 
 (1) (2) (3) 
 Fuel riot Fuel riot Fuel riot 


















Observations 1,493 228 206 
Source: Authors’ own. Created using project data. 
t statistics in parentheses 
(1) Panel regression with country level fixed effects and year dummies 
(2) Panel logit with country level fixed effects and year dummies 
(3) Probit with year and country dummies 
∗ p < 0.1, ∗∗ p < 0.05, ∗∗∗ p < 0.001 
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